Showing posts with label rcn. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rcn. Show all posts

Thursday, 22 October 2026

HMCS KOOTENAY Gearbox Explosion

This article originally appeared on the Hazegray and Underway site, which was taken offline last year. I noted at the time of writing between 2007 and 2009: The text here has been summarized from several published and unpublished sources, and should not be taken as the definitive account of this event. Any and all errors in the following text should be taken as that of this author. Please provide comments, corrections, anecdotes, and/or equipment identifications to the author. 

I have also written two articles that appeared in the September 2019 and October 2019 issues of Warships IFR magazine. 

KOOTENAY at sea off Halifax.

On the morning of October 23, 1969, HMCS KOOTENAY was exercising in UK waters with a Canadian Task Group consisting of HMC Ships BONAVENTURE, TERRA NOVA, FRASER, ST. LAURENT, OTTAWA, ASSINIBOINE, MARGAREE, and SAGUENAY. The Task Group was headed home, westward from the English Channel, and at 0605 hours when approximately 200 miles off Plymouth, England, KOOTENAY and SAGUENAY were ordered to separate from the main group and carry out full power trials.

SAGUENAY completed her trials before 0800 hours and launched her Sea King helicopter, and KOOTENAY started hers at around 0810 hours. The engine room received the order for FULL AHEAD - BOTH ENGINES, and the throttles on both port and starboard turbines were opened up. Both port and starboard turbines of KOOTENAY's Y100 steam powerplant reached maximum revolutions, in the range of 5,750 RPM, and the main reduction gearboxes transferred power to the propeller shafts as shaft speed reached 221 RPM (rated maximum shaft speeds were between 220 RPM (heavy draught) and 227 RPM (light draught). The ten engineering crew members present in the engine room were stationed forward of the control console at the forward end of the engine room, including the Engineering Officer (EO) and Chief Engine Room Artificer (CERA). The engine room crew and their duty stations were as follows:

  • Lt. Al Kennedy  (EO)
  • CPO1 Vaino ’Ski’ Partanen  (CERA)
  • CPO2 William Alfred ‘Billy’ Boudreau   (Engine Room Chief)
  • PO1 John MacKinnon  (starboard throttle)
  • PO1 Eric George Harman  (port throttle)
  • LS Pierre “Pete” Bourrett (recording at the console)
  • LS Thomas Gordon Crabbe  (fire and bilge pump)
  • LS Gary Wayne Hutton  (torsion meter readings)
  • AS Allan "Dinger" Bell  (main engine temperature readings)
  • AS Michael Allen Hardy  (main engine temperature readings)

PO2 Ski Partanen (left) in May, 1950 at graduation from HMCS CORNWALLIS. Photo courtesy of Neil Goodwill.

At 0821, the temperature in the starboard gearbox reached a critical level (estimated at 650 degrees C) and the gearbox exploded, sending a fireball forward in the engine room and up through both engine room hatches into the main flats (main fore-aft passageway), also named Burma Road. Smoke immediately filled the ship. Orders were given to close the throttles and evacuate the engine room. Due to the flames from the gearbox, the aft hatch was inaccessible, and flames were being directed towards the forward hatch by the circulation fans. Of the four engine room crew who managed to escape via the forward hatch (Kennedy, MacKinnon, Bourrett, and Bell), one (Bourret) perished at the top of the hatch and the rest suffered severe burns. The remaining six engineering staff all perished in the engine room. The engineering officer made his way to the bridge, and before collapsing from his injuries, he reported on the explosion and stated that the Emergency Shut-offs in the flats had to be activated immediately to stop the flow of steam to the still-operating engines.

Fire damage to one of the engine room access hatches in Burma Road.

Two additional crew members also died. OS Nelson Galloway died of smoke inhalation during the fire, and PO John Stringer died several days later in BONAVENTURE as a direct result of smoke inhalation.

The starboard gearbox with the cover removed.

Despite the explosion, and the closing of the turbine throttles, both turbines (now-unmanned) were still receiving steam from the boiler room and the ship was charging ahead at full speed. In fact, the steam-driven lube oil circulating pump in the starboard gearbox was still working, and continued feeding the flames with oil. The wheelhouse (located below decks on this class of destroyer) filled with smoke and had to be abandoned, presumably leaving the ship out of control until the emergency helm station could be manned. To make matters worse, the turbo alternator (steam driven electrical power generator, and main source of ship's power) was knocked out of commission by the explosion, and the ship's diesel generators were not rigged for auto-start in the event of power failure. As a result, ship to ship communications were disrupted during a critical period as available fire fighting equipment was running out. Most of the fire fighting equipment, and Chemox breathing apparatus, was stored in the main flats, which was filled with smoke and flame.

The aluminum casing of the starboard gearbox has been ruptured by the explosion.

The forward diesel generator was started, restoring ship's power, and at 0836 KOOTENAY was able to broadcast a message stating her emergency and requesting assistance. SAGUENAY directed her Sea King to KOOTENAY to assess the situation. This Sea King ended up ferrying equipment, supplies, and personnel from other ships in the Task Group.

Taken from another Sea King, a Sea King approaches HMCS Kootenay. Photo by Allan J. Snowie and used with permission.

At 0840, the fire was at its height, and the ship was short of available fire fighting equipment. Seven crew were dead, and numerous more were incapacitated by burns or smoke inhalation. The fire was heating up the aft 3"/50 gun ammo magazine, and more crew were tied up relocating ammunition away from the shared bulkhead. The bulkhead was sprayed down, but this reduced water pressure and reduced effectiveness of fire fighting efforts in the engine room. The aft generator had not yet been started, incapacitating the aft fire pump.

The starboard gearbox with the cover removed.

At 0900, the boiler room crew were still at their posts shutting down the boilers and therefore the flow of steam to the engine room. A bulge was starting to form in the starboard hull plating adjacent to the gearbox, and visible signs of the fire were visible on the ship's exterior including smoke from vents and scorch marks on the hull exterior. The fire gained ground between 0930 and 1000 due to pressure loss from spraying the magazine, until an engineering rating was eventually found to start the aft generator thus making the aft fire pump available for service.

Looking forward and to starboard, with the control console to the right of the photo.

At about 0945, LCDR David Jones arrived by helicopter from BONAVENTURE to relieve Lt. Kennedy and take over as Engineering Officer.

LCDR Jones reported to the bridge, and in his report he noted the following:

"a) Major fire in engine room out of control.

b) Known casualties in area of fire.

c) Previous E.O. burned and transferred to BONAVENTURE.

d) Boiler room shut down.

e) Number 1 and 3 diesels supplying electrical power.

f) "F" section isolated electrically.

g) Fire fighting teams had entered the after engine room hatch and gone part way down the ladder, but intense heat and lack of visibility precluded further entrance.

h) Lt/Cdr. Schwartz was taking charge of fire fighting along with Cmd.O Moffat.

i) Ventilation to engine room stopped.

j) Fire main pressure low (35 PSI)."


The heat of the fire was so intense that it melted this engine room ladder, which made access to the engine room by fire fighting crews more difficult.

It would not be until 1010 that the fire could be considered under control. When CPO2 Robert George entered the engine room via the forward hatch at 1015, the heat was so intense that it was necessary to keep a low velocity fog on him at all times. The fire was put out between 1030 and 1100, and after 1100 crews could enter the engine room and remain without being driven back by the severe heat. KOOTENAY was rigged for tow, and SAGUENAY was tasked to start the tow which was underway by 1114. The engine room was cooled down between 1130 and 1215, at which point the damage assessment and removal of the six bodies from the engine room began.

Damaged instrument panels in the engine room.

KOOTENAY was badly damaged, and only remained afloat due to the efforts and sacrifices of her crew. Seven of her crew members, present in the engine room for the full power trial, had died, and two more crew members died of injuries sustained outside the engine room. Fifty-three crew members were injured.

A valve is pictured in front of a fire-gutted bulkhead.

The tow was subsequently taken over by the Royal Navy tug SAMSONIA (formerly Foundation Josephine) on October 24th and KOOTENAY returned to the UK under SAGUENAY's continued escort. KOOTENAY was dry-docked and her propellers were removed to prepare her for the tow to Canada, which was undertaken by the Dutch tug Elbe on November 16th. KOOTENAY arrived in Halifax on November 27th. 

A fire-blackened instrument panel in the engine room.

A Board of Inquiry was set up immediately following the accident. Captain Chris Pratt (ret.) was commanding the 5th Squadron at that time, and he was flown ashore to conduct the Board of Inquiry in Plymouth. He recalls: "To help me with the inquiry I had an engineer officer, a medical officer and a damage control specialist. A civilian designer from NDHQ, who was the one to note the wrongly installed bearing liner, came to offer his advice. The liners had been designed to fit either port or starboard gearbox, but care was needed to install them the correct way round. Apparently it's not unheard of for a bearing to "wipe" without catastrophic results. That had probably happened during an earlier full power run, and probably when I commanded the ship, for I was her skipper from January 1965 until June 1966. But exactly how it happened was only a matter for speculation, for as you know, fire requires fuel, heat, and oxygen. There was a vent pipe...from the gearbox. It ran up through the PO's mess to the upper deck, and witnesses reported a sound like that of a pipe organ in the PO's mess before the explosion. The theory was that initially a fire had started using the small amount of oxygen present in the gearbox. This created an overpressure up throught the vent, which made the sound, and then had extinguished itself for lack of oxygen. The pipe cooled, outside air was drawn down into the gearbox, and it exploded."

A crew member stands by the blackened control console at the forward end of the engine room.

It was concluded that the insert bearing shells had been installed backwards in the starboard gearbox four years previously, which cut off the proper flow of lubricating oil, leading to overheating of the bearing and the ignition of the lubrication oil. It was also noted that the explosion and fire had killed and injured a significant portion of the engineering staff, thus incapacitating a large part of the crew most experienced in damage control measures. This had a particularly deleterious effect on the organization and effectiveness of the damage control and fire fighting crews in the aftermath of the explosion. After the accident, the ship's captain, CDR Neil Norton, wrote that "...a less professional crew could easily have finished the day in life rafts".

A wreath laying ceremony at sea.

Captain Pratt also comments: "The "PTSD" factor was disturbing, even thought the term didn't come into use for another twenty years or more. It wasn't wartime, when enemy damage might be expected, and the event came as a total shock. Of course we're trained to expect the unexpected, and I was sure that everyone had behaved correctly, and some had gone far beyond what could have been expected. But there was certainly no counselling. Vice Admiral Griffin, the Admiral at Plymouth, offered to find homes in the neighbourhood, to send everyone on a few days leave, which was done during the Second War, but the two ships' companies preferred to stick together, which I could understand. There was such a widespread syndrome of self-blame, even by those who had done far more than their duty, which is characteristic behaviour after a shock. I feel particularly for Sub-Lieutenant Reifenstein, who put on scuba gear to crawl along the Burma Road. He blamed himself bitterly for not being able to find the steam shut off valve." Partly as a result of the incident, Sub Lieutenant Reifenstein later took his own life.

The accident on KOOTENAY ultimately influenced the Canadian Navy's training in Damage Control down to the present day, and in fact the Navy's East Coast Damage Control training facility is named after KOOTENAY. This remains the worst peacetime accident ever experienced by the Canadian Navy.

A funeral service, presumably on the quarterdeck of SAGUENAY in Plymouth. Note KOOTENAY in the background, with scorch marks on her starboard side amidships.

Crew members who lost their lives in the accident include:

  • CPO1 Vaino ’Ski’ Partanen
  • CPO2 William Alfred ‘Billy’ Boudreau
  • PO Eric George Harman
  • PO Lewis John Stringer
  • LS Pierre “Pete” Bourrett
  • LS Thomas Gordon Crabbe
  • LS Gary Wayne Hutton
  • OS Michael Allen Hardy
  • OS Nelson Murray Galloway

With the exception of PO Stringer, who died in Bonaventure during the return voyage and who as a result was buried in Canada, these were the last Canadian servicemen killed overseas whose bodies were not repatriated.

I have also written about the type of steam powerplant used in these ships, and you can compare the fire damaged equipment in the photos above with the undamaged engine room in HMCS Terra Nova here. 

Sources:

  • Barrie, Ron and Macpherson, Ken. (1996). Cadillac of Destroyers: HMCS ST. LAURENT and Her Successors. Vanwell Publishing Ltd. St. Catherines, Ont.
  • Forbes, Gord. (2007). Article "An Incident on the High Seas" in Soundings Magazine. 
  • Heimpel, Roger, LCDR. (2007). Article on gearbox explosion. Provided by author.
  • Jones, David, LCDR. (1969). Report on explosion. Provided by author.
  • Kingston, Gaylord. (2006). Article "Tragedy at Sea" in Crown and Anchor. http://www.acpoa.ca/news/oct2006/oct2006.pdf
  • McLeod, John, CPO1. (1999) Article "KOOTENAY tragedy remembered 30 years later". Source unknown. Courtesy Neil Goodwill.
  • Pratt, Chris, Captain (ret.). (2009) E-mail correspondence.
  • RCN Publication. (1968). Machinery Digest for Destroyer Escorts, 205, 206, 257 and Classes. Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, Ottawa.
  • Unattributed timeline of events by speakers CDRs Walton and Yanow, date unknown.  http://www.forposterityssake.ca/
  • Except where noted otherwise, all photos are courtesy of LCDR Roger Heimpel, CFNES Damage Control Division.


Monday, 16 September 2024

The RCN's future River Class destroyers

Back on June 28th, the Halifax Shipyard hosted a ceremonial steel cutting for the new River Class of destroyers that are being built for the Royal Canadian Navy. I attended the event and wrote a piece that is appearing in the September 2024 issue of Warships International Fleet Review - which should be hitting Canadian shelves shortly, if not already. Atlantic News in Halifax usually carries the magazine, as Chapters/Indigo often has it as well. The cover looks like this:


My story appears on Pages 32 through 34:


The new ships will look something like this, based on this rendering provided courtesy of the RCN:



My article covers some of the challenges faced by the program and how they are being addressed. If you are interested, please check it out!

Ceremonial cutting of steel for the first River Class destroyer and the first Canadian Coast Guard AOPV.


Monday, 28 November 2022

Launch of the future HMCS William Hall

The fourth of six new AOPVs to be built for the Royal Canadian Navy, the future HMCS William Hall, was launched by Irving Shipbuilding on Sunday. I caught her being towed back to the shipyard after launching. Halifax Shipping News has photos of the actual launch process.





Only a week before, the ship was still on land and looking like she wasn't going anywhere fast.





Two slightly modified additional ships (making a total of eight) will be built for the Canadian Coast Guard, once the ships for the Navy are complete.


Wednesday, 19 October 2016

Vickers 3"/70 Twin A.A. Mark 6 mounting

Earlier today I saw a discussion around the guns used on the ST. LAURENT, RESTIGOUCHE, MACKENZIE, and ANNAPOLIS classes of destroyer escorts that served in the RCN starting in the 1950s, in particular the Vickers 3"/70 and the FMC 3"/50.

The latter was used on all four classes (originally both fore and aft on the ST. LAURENT class, forward on the ANNAPOLIS class, and aft on the RESTIGOUCHE and MACKENZIE classes), while the former was used only as the forward mounting on the RESTIGOUCHE and MACKENZIE classes. 

I have previously written a bit about both mountings on the Hazegray and Underway website, where I variously wrote:

About the 3"/50:

"Mountings started out open to the weather, and fibreglass and aluminum gun shields were added later. The shields were relatively fragile, and photos often show the forward mounting facing aft to protect it from storm damage.

Mounted on the foc'st'le and quarterdeck of ST. LAURENT derived destroyer escorts, forward of the bridge. Also mounted in X position on Tribal class DDEs, and A position on ALGONQUIN and aft on CRESCENT after the latter two's ASW conversions. BONAVENTURE carried four of these mountings when originally commissioned, but had the two forward mountings removed during her 1967 refit. Of the MACKENZIE class ships, QU'APPELLE carried a second of these mountings forward in place of the 3"/70 Mk.6 found on the rest of the class members.

The two PROTECTEUR class AOR's were originally fitted with this mounting on the foc'st'le, but its location exposed it to damage from heavy seas, and it was removed in 1984. The mountings were preserved ashore, and one was re-installed on PROTECTEUR for her deployment to the Persian Gulf in 1990-91.
The mounting was originally fitted with an SPG 34 tracking radar right on the mounting, which was later replaced with an SPG 48 tracker between the barrels (see photo 6). On NIPIGON and ANNAPOLIS, the SPG 48 and GUNAR fire control system was replaced with the Mk.69 GFCS and integral SPG 515 tracker during their DELEX refits."

and about the 3"/70:

"Mounted on the foc'st'le of destroyer escorts, forward of the bridge. This mount was originally developed for the RN for use in aircraft carriers, but was eventually installed in RN service only in the TIGER class cruisers, which mounted three mountings each (one forward, two amidships). This mounting experienced teething problems when entering service in RCN destroyer escorts, but these were eventually resolved. The ammunition handling system was apparently referred to as "the bottling plant" due to the high rate of fire achieved when working properly."

I came across some other information in my files on the 3"/70 that I thought I would post here. While originally marked CONFIDENTIAL and/or RESTRICTED, these documents were long ago declassified. I don't believe I have the entire document, but here is what I do have (hopefully they are legible) from either BRCN 1740 or CBCN 5902:

Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
A different cut-away view from a different document.
Page 4
Page 5
The only other Navy to use this gun was the Royal Navy on their TIGER class cruisers, TIGER, LION and BLAKE.

The forward 3"/70 on TIGER. M.D. Thomas photo.
Two more of these mountings (for a total of 3 per ship) were mounted port and starboard farther aft, though these mountings were eventually removed in favour of a new helicopter hangar.

A note about copyright: The pages of the document on the Vickers gun is hosted on my Smugmug website, and therefore displays my copyright watermark, but this document would originally have been copyright of the Crown.

Monday, 2 May 2016

Battle of the Atlantic Sunday 2016

On Battle of the Atlantic Sunday, one did not need to look too far in the approaches of Halifax Harbour for reminders of the importance of seaborne traffic to Canada, as well as our ongoing dedication to helping make sure that it continues to pass unmolested. The modern equivalents of the freighters and convoy escorts that plied the North Atlantic during the Second World War were both evident Sunday morning, with the outgoing HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN passing the inbound container ship Allise P. Seventy-five years ago, both ships would have had the added complication of passing through the gate of an anti-submarine net that spanned between York Redoubt and McNab's Island, a firm delineation between the safety of Halifax Harbour and the dangers of U-boats at sea.

Outbound HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN passing the McNab's Island lighthouse. The anti-submarine net spanned from the spit of land upon which the lighthouse stands to York Redoubt.

Container ship Allise P inbound a few minutes later.
The submarine nets ran between the previous lighthouse on McNab's Island in the background, and York Redoubt from where the photo was taken. The two gate vessels in the centre of the image were responsible for opening and closing the gate in the nets to allow authorized ships to pass. They were First World War Battle class trawlers and were painted red and green to correspond to Port and Starboard for incoming ships. The submarine nets were installed by Foundation Maritime, and their Foundation Jupiter can be seen in the foreground. Ocean Eagle (top left), formerly an Admiralty Saint class tug named St. Arvans, was a tug owned by the Federal Government that was put under control of Foundation Maritime for the duration of the war. This photo is on display at the Canadian War Museum.
The first Sunday in May sees the commemoration of the Battle of the Atlantic that ended 71 years ago, and this year I was privileged to  accompany HMCS MONTREAL for the service and committal ceremony held off Point Pleasant Park, the latter being an opportunity to commit the ashes of veterans to the sea.

Arriving in Halifax by ferry that morning, I was treated to seeing a few of the ships "dressed overall" for the occasion, including HMCS ATHABASKAN (herself being the third ship of that name, the first having been lost off the coast of France during the Second World War).

HMCS ATHABASKAN (DDH 282).
Families of departed veterans as well as other passengers embarked MONTREAL and gathered on the helicopter deck, where we received a briefing from the ship's CO (via loudspeaker) and the Cox'n (in person).

MONTREAL's kisbee ring and ensign.

MONTREAL's Cox'n briefs the ship's guests.
After departing the jetty in HMC Dockyard, MONTREAL headed out to her destination off Point Pleasant Park. On our way down the waterfront, CSS Acadia (and the former HMCS ACADIA, as she served the RCN during both World Wars) dipped her flag as we passed.

CSS Acadia.

MONTREAL's wake as we headed out, with the George's Island lighthouse to the left and with McNab's Island in the background.
After arriving off Point Pleasant Park (where another service was already in progress at the Commonwealth War Memorial), some of the ship's company manned the starboard rail facing Point Pleasant Park.

Manning the starboard rail.
Soon, two padres held a commemoration service at the aft end of the helicopter deck to remember the personnel and ships lost during the Battle of the Atlantic.

Padres Lt (N) Sebastien Dupont and LCdr (Ret'd) Andrew Cooke.

Battle of the Atlantic Commemoration Service.
During the service, a bell is rung for each of the RCN ships lost during the war.

Ringing the ship's bell for each RCN ship lost during the Battle of the Atlantic.
After the service, the ship's ensign was lowered to half mast and the committal ceremony began.

Setting the ensign to half mast.
After some words from the padres, the ashes of each veteran are committed to the sea. The box of ashes are placed on a plank and covered by the flag of their service, and the ashes are piped overboard as the box slides down the plank.

Ship's company facing starboard during the committal ceremony.

Ship's company facing starboard during the committal ceremony.

The committal party stands at the ready as family members look on.

The board is tipped, and a veteran's ashes are committed to the sea.

Each veteran's ashes were piped over the side.

A Lieutenant, the ship's Commanding Officer, and Cox'n (respectively) salute as a veteran's ashes are committed to the deep.

Of the three in uniform, the furthest is CPO1 Thomas Lizotte (Cox'n) and in the middle is Cdr Kristjan Monaghan (MONTREAL's CO).
With the committal ceremony over, food was served in the ship's hangar, and MONTREAL turned around to head back up the harbour to return to HMC Dockyard. I took this opportunity to head up to the foc'st'le to get a different perspective on this part of the trip.

MONTREAL's foc'st'le party facing to port on the trip back up the harbour.

Panorama of the foc'st'le, with the Halifax skyline on the left, and MONTREAL's Bofors 57mm Mk.3 on the right.

The first of the lines are thrown ashore from the foc'st'le. 
I would like to thank the ship's company of HMCS MONTREAL for being perfect hosts during the Battle of the Atlantic Sunday ceremonies. I always enjoy being able to document this event, but it is an added pleasure to watch the men and women of the Royal Canadian Navy at work.

For those interested, I also have an online gallery with all of my processed images from Sunday.